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> La une > Stormoviks > The Changing Nature of War ?  The Changing Nature of War ?The Changing Nature of War ?
It is remarkable how much the modern study of war persists
in considering war a phenomenon in constant metamorphosis. This tendency is clearly
reflected in the manner in which classic polemicists of different historical periods
are systematically differentiated and contrasted. For instance, War
contemplated by Sun Tzu in the 5th century B.C. and War
considered by Clausewitz in the early 19th century are generally presented as two
radically different phenomena. It must be granted that there are some striking
contrasts between these two views of war. On the one hand, the "Dead
Chinese" seems to cling towards the soft power end of the war spectrum
when he says that “[t]he art of war is to overcome your enemy without combat”
or suggests that “[o]vercoming your enemy without combat is the apogee of
skill.” (The Art of War). On the other end, the "Dead Prussian"
appears to lean towards the hard power end of that same spectrum with assertions
such as “[w]ar is the unlimited application of brute force” or “[w]ar is an act
of violence whose purpose is to compel your adversary to execute your will.” (On
War). To some extant, it is even possible to view Sun Tzu and Clausewitz as
two diametrically opposable if not contradictory paradigms of war (Table 1). Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: Opposite Paradigms
However, despite these apparent contraindications, this
comprehension is largely excessive and flawed. What a careful study of these
two thinkers shows is that not only do they deal with the same object but they also
agree on its fundamental parameters and concur on the universal and permanent
nature of war. As suggested by Basil Liddell Hart, "Clausewitz's
On War…did not differ so much from Sun Tzu's conclusions as it appeared
to do on the surface." (Forward to The Art of War,
pp. v-vi). "A careful comparison of
[the works of] Sun Tzu and Clausewitz indicates that these strategists are
mostly in agreement on the fundamental issues" agrees Michael Handel
(Masters of War). The Unchanging Nature of War – Reflection of Human
Nature Two centuries ago, Carl von Clausewitz put it blatantly:
“All wars are things of the same nature.” What was meant is that, like a verb, war may be declined and assume different
forms, but its radical stem remains unchanged, whether it is conjugated in the
past or past perfect tense. In all of its more essential, truly crucial fundamentals,
the nature of war is everlasting. While its many historical manifestations may
give the illusion of transformation, the DNA of war is eternal. "In its fundamentals", concurs J. Black,
"war changes far less frequently and significantly than most people
appreciate. This is not only because it involves a constant—[the human
will]—but also because the material aspect of war is less important than its
social, cultural and political contexts and enablers." (War in the
New Century (2001), p.114). As
suggested by J. Black, war is unchanging because it is the reflection of human
nature and, more specifically, of human eternal motives for confrontation. Those
eternal motives, diagnosed by Thucydides at the time of the Peloponnesian War, are
fear, honour and interest (The Peloponnesian War). As a reflection of human nature, war must be
understood as the complex combination
of the physical and the psychological, allied with the science of knowledge and
the wisdom of morality. According
to this view, warfare is not restricted to the material capacity – what is
physically doable. It is also determined by the psychological will to fight; the
cognitive information defining the courses of action and how to fight; and,
perhaps more importantly, the moral beliefs that define the reason to fight,
what is legitimate and what is not. Depending on the historical context, these
defining parameters combine differently, creating the illusion that war is
changing. As stated by Sun Tzu, melodies are so numerous, but they are all based on
the same few musical notes: "The musical notes are only five in number, but their
melodies are so numerous that one can not hear them all" (The Art of
War). Similarly,
there is only a handset of parameters constituting the essence of war, but the
combinations are, so to speak, countless. The misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of the constant recombination of these four elements is one
of the main reasons why modern scholars tend to misconstrue the unchanging
nature of war. Overemphasizing the Importance of the Material
Parameter Another – yet directly related - source of illusion
leading modern theorists to believe in the constant metamorphosis of the nature
of war rests on the overemphasizing of the material and technological dimension
of modern warfare. This is the common error of many of the latest military
theories and doctrines assuming that we have entered into an era of so-called
"new wars". A founding theoretical text for the thesis that war is
undergoing far more than just a light makeover is the brilliant book – read
brilliantly wrong - by Martin van Creveld, The
Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). In a less brilliant way,
the transformative theory is also reflected in technocentric concepts such as C4ISR, Network Centric Warfare
(NCW), Cyber-War and military doctrines such as Joint Vision 2010 and
DOD’s "Transformation Planning Guidance" – all of which blossomed
between the immediate post-cold war period and September 2001. The technocentric view rests on a terribly poor
understanding of the nature of war. It is interesting to note that most of the
classic theorists of war caution against this restrictive and fetishist view:
Clausewitz warned in his time that "[v]ery few in the new manifestation in war can
be ascribed to new inventions…they result mainly from the transformation of
society and the new social conditions." (On war). Mao agreed when
he wrote that "…the so called theory that ‘weapons’ decide everything
constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a subjective and
one-sided view…weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive
factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength
is…a contest of human power and moral." (Selected Military Writings, pp. 217-218). As the recent history
shows, there
is some danger related to this technocentric view. Many strategists come to acknowledge
today that the Back to the Future After several decades of emphasizing the technological dimension of war, it seems that its human dimension (moral, cognitive and psychological) is recognized again as central. By necessity, insurgent and terrorist movements exploit this human dimension by waging war at the level of psychology, information, culture and religion. In the West there is also the development of new theories of war, such as the concept of the fourth generation warfare (4GW) that takes into account the non-material, non-technological dimensions of war. But in the big scheme of things, "[w]hatever about warfare is changing, it is not, and cannot be, warfare’s very nature" estimates Colin Gray (Parameters, 2006/07) War is not changing its character, let alone miraculously accomplishing the impossible and changing its nature. The truth of the matter is that the nature of war in the 21st century is the same as it was in the 5th century B.C. As C. Gray convincingly formulates it, if war’s nature were to alter, it would become something else. This logical line of reasoning is essential to keep in mind. Despite Kantian hopeful allegations on the advent of perpetual peace on earth and the recurring sloppy allusions to its supposedly shifting nature, war is an eternal subject that cannot redefine. Cyril Pahlavi Ecrit par Cyril Cyrus PAHLAVI |
